Jan 22, 2016

Diversity Is a Code Word for Firing You, White Boy!

via TradYouth

Slate’s feminist food blogger, L.V. Anderson, has a new post explaining how Corporate Diversity Policies Often Harm the People They’re Intended to Help, helpfully explaining how to implement a diversity program which effectively harms the people they’re intended to harm. She cites a Harvard Business Review article, “Diversity Policies Rarely Make Companies Fairer, and They Feel Threatening to White Men.”
In one study, white men took part in a simulated job interview. When they were told that the company they were interviewing with embraced diversity, they worried about being at a disadvantage—and their heart rates rose, suggesting they felt threatened.
Science has confirmed that White males know what they refuse to publicly admit, that diversity is a code word for anti-White. L.V. Anderson doesn’t bother to grapple with whether or not good and honest people’s jobs are actually threatened by diversity policies. This is because she actively despises and dehumanizes White men. Like many (but not all!) White women, she envisions herself aligned with team diversity against the White male.
Diversity training sessions can backfire, too—especially when the trainings are mandatory and emphasize the legal consequences of discrimination. Attempting to change attitudes about diversity by emphasizing the social unacceptability of prejudice actually increases prejudice by triggering “a direct counterresponse (i.e., defiance) to threatened autonomy” (in other words, by triggering people’s inner toddlers).
The White male is integrally lacking validity. His job isn’t valid. His ideas aren’t valid. His contributions to the corporation aren’t valid. His concerns aren’t valid. Even his visceral biometrics are appropriate targets of mockery. As an exercise, pretend to communicate in such a dehumanizing manner about another group and you’ll appreciate how anti-White L.V. Anderson’s line of thinking is. “Proposing literacy tests at the polling stations causes a direct counterresponse in Black men, triggering their inner toddlers.”
And policies that constrain managers—for instance, requiring them to consider job tests and performance reviews when making hiring and promotion decisions—seem to reduce diversity rather than increase it.
Of course, you can’t just make it strictly meritocratic. That would just play right into the hands of White males. Any threat to the good old boy network would come from Asian male applicants, and nobody on either side of this argument cares for that outcome.
“Policies and trainings tend to piss people off more than anything,” one corporate diversity professional in New York told me. “It causes resentment.”
That doesn’t mean all diversity policies are counterproductive. It’s true that most such programs aren’t tested for effectiveness before implementation, which means that many executives are spending money on useless or counterproductive initiatives.
They define success strictly in terms of replacing White males, and yet they manage to be baffled that White males would feel resentful or threatened. They obviously are threatened, and should resent less connected and qualified people stealing their livelihood.

Fortunately for anti-Whites, there is an effective strategy for achieving diversity goals.
So which diversity policies actually work? […] In a paper published last year, Dobbin, Kalev, and their colleague Daniel Schrage argue that successful policies rely on engagement, accountability, and transparency. First, they engage managers in diversity efforts, so that managers feel like they’re a part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Diversity task forces “are just hugely effective compared to the other things that companies can do,” Dobbin told me.
In short, the trick to achieving diversity goals is to set aside a team of White males who are protected from diversity on the condition that they impose diversity on the other subset. Pit the White males against each other in an occupational Mortal Kombat and watch the sparks fly!

If you want something done right and on time, you hire a White male to get the job done, even when that job’s purging White males. Twitter recently caught heat for hiring a “White” male to head its diversity program, but it makes sense. If your company absolutely must hire against merit and talent or get sued out of business, then you hire the guy with the merit and talent to make it happen. To Twitter’s credit, he’s actually Jewish and gay, not that either gays, Jews, or gay Jews are especially underprivileged or underrepresented.
Given that situation, the fact that good-faith attempts to educate managers about diversity can make white men feel and act defiant might make women and people of color throw up their hands in frustration. Can’t white male managers get over themselves and stop being defensive about efforts to make workplaces more inclusive?
Just about all White males, self-exclusive, have a powerful urge to look and feel like morally upstanding team players. They’re eager to throw their co-workers under the bus with abandon to virtue signal. But if you hit too close to home, threatening his livelihood, threatening his neighborhood, or threatening his children’s safety, he’ll be cornered. Each time the music stops, there’s one less chair in the circle for White males. You can expect the fights between them to get uglier and uglier until they learn to pick up the chairs and throw them at the anti-Whites running the game.

A Review of “Why the Germans? Why the Jews?,” Part 3

via The Occidental Observer

Part 1
Part 2

While asserting that German hostility toward Jews has its origins in a pathological “envy,” as a fervent leftist Aly would never extend this line of reasoning to account for the hostility of American Blacks or other non-White groups toward Whites. Aly can safely posit that “intellectually inferior” Germans who “lacked confidence in their identity” had an envy-driven hatred for “intellectually superior” and upwardly mobile Jews, yet never assert that intellectually inferior Blacks have an envy-driven hatred for intellectually superior and upwardly mobile Whites. Instead he would doubtless affirm the bogus narrative that Black hostility to Whites is a legitimate response to an insidious White “racism” that has impeded their social and economic advancement. This, of course, is despite that fact that this supposedly ubiquitous and malign force has somehow failed to hinder the social and economic advancement of East Asians in Western societies.

Nor would Aly extrapolate his pathological envy thesis of intergroup hostility to explain the vastly disproportionate Jewish participation in the Bolshevik Revolution and the other oppressive communist regimes of Eastern Europe. This despite that fact that, in response to legal restrictions in Tsarist Russia that limited their economic and educational opportunities, millions of Jews gravitated to Zionism and Communism. That envy and resentment were key factors behind the overwhelming Jewish attraction to radical left was obvious to Norman Cantor who noted:
The Bolshevik Revolution and some of its aftermath represented, from one perspective, Jewish revenge. During the heyday of the Cold War, American Jewish publicists spent a lot of time denying that—as 1930s anti-Semites claimed—Jews played a disproportionately important role in Soviet and world Communism. The truth is until the early 1950s Jews did play such a role, and there is nothing to be ashamed of. In time Jews will learn to take pride in the record of the Jewish Communists in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. It was a species of striking back.[i]
Indeed a huge weakness of Why the Germans? Why the Jews? is the total neglect of the Jewish-Communist symbiosis and how this contributed (independently of envy at Jewish social advancement) to rising support for the NSDAP and other “anti-Semitic” political parties in Germany. It is common knowledge that when, after the chaos of World War I, revolutions erupted all over Europe, Jews were everywhere at the helm. One of Hitler’s most oft-repeated themes in the 1920s was the deadly threat that a “bloody Bolshevization” posed to Germany. In 1928 Hitler wrote:
The goal is the destruction of the inherently anti-Semitic Russia as well as the destruction of the German Reich, whose administration and army still provide resistance to the Jews. A further goal is the overthrow of those dynasties that have not yet been made subordinate to a Jewish-dependent and led democracy.
This goal in the Jewish struggle has at least to some degree been completely achieved. Tsarism and Kaiserism in Germany have been eliminated. With the help of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian upper class and also the national intelligentsia were — with inhuman torture and barbarity — murdered and completely eradicated. The victims of this Jewish fight for dominance in Russia totaled twenty-eight to thirty million dead among the Russian people. Fifteen times as many as the Great War cost Germany. After the successful Revolution he [further] tore away all the ties of orderliness, morality, custom, and so on, abolished marriage as a higher institution, and proclaimed in its place universal licentiousness with the goal that through this disorderly bastardy, to breed a generally inferior human mush which itself is incapable of leadership and ultimately will no longer be able to do without the Jews as its only intellectual element.[ii]
Another National Socialist source noted that: “Only those who have experienced that period of Jewish terror and slaughter, the murder of hostages, plundering and acts of arson [in the Munich communist uprisings of 1918–1919], are able to realize why Munich became the birthplace of National Socialism, whence the movement spread to other parts of Germany, and finally put an end to Jewish domination.”

Despite the centrality of the threat of “Jewish-Bolshevism” as part of the National Socialist platform, Aly completely ignores the whole topic because it simply doesn’t fit into his “pathological envy” theory of German “anti-Semitism.” In a work of some 304 pages purporting to analyze the origins Hitler’s popularity, the word “communism” rates a mere three mentions.

No mention of Jewish ethnic networking

In addition to his lack of consideration of how the very real fear of communism contributed to support for the National Socialists, another key weakness of Why the Germans? Why the Jews? is the lack of any discussion of the role of Jewish ethnic networking in the rapid social and economic advancement of Jews at the time. Jewish historian Jerry Muller acknowledged in his book Capitalism and the Jews the importance of Jewish ethnic networking contributing to Jewish upward social mobility, observing that “the obligation to look after fellow Jews was deeply embedded in Jewish law and culture, and it existed not just in theory but in practice.”[iii] A recurrent theme in Germany throughout the nineteenth century was how, if unchecked by the state, Jewish ethnic networking invariably led to their monopolization of entire industries and professions, and how this harmed German interests.

In 1819, for instance, the German writer Hartwig von Hundt-Radowsky noted that the anti-Jewish “Hep Hep” riots that year in southern Germany were precipitated by “the rights granted to Israelites in many states” which led “to the poverty and malnourishment that prevails in many regions since the Jews choke off all the trade and industry of the Christian populace.” He noted that the success that Jews recorded “in all profitable businesses ever since several states, guided by a misunderstood humanism, accorded them the freedom to choose their own trades, which is also a license to plunge Christians into misery.”[iv]

Around the same time the German academic Jakob Friedrich Fries likewise warned of the dangers that Jewish ethnic networking and nepotism presented for the native population, pointing out that “the Christian merchant, who stands alone, has no hope of competing.” Citing the example of Jews in the city of Frankfurt, who had been released from the ghetto in 1796 and had risen rapidly up in society, he warned: “Allow them to continue for a mere forty years or more, and the sons of the best Christian houses will have to hire on as their manservants.”[v]

The economist Friedrich List argued in 1820 that the state had the right and duty to protect the native German majority from Jewish economic domination and exploitation.[vi] Legal restrictions on Jews were lifted in the Grand Duchy of Posen in 1833, a region with a significant Jewish population. Soon thereafter a citizens’ committee on Jewish affairs noted that following the easing of restrictions it had not taken long for Jews “to take over high roads and market squares and dominate commerce and industry.” If they were given full citizenship rights, the committee argued, “almost all the towns and villages in the Grand Duchy would come under the exclusive administration of Jews.”[vii]

In the Kingdom of Saxony the general populace pressured the royal family to maintain anti-Jewish restrictions on certain types of economic activity. Dresden allowed “at most” four Jewish merchants, lest commercial streets “swarm with Jewish salesmen and trade fall into Jewish hands” Local civic leaders warned that any easing of restrictions would result in “Jews inundating the entire country so that soon farmers wouldn’t be able to sell a single calf without Jewish involvement.”[viii]

Kevin MacDonald notes in A People That Shall Dwell Alone that from “the standpoint of the group, it was always more important to maximize the resource flow from the gentile community to the Jewish community, rather than to allow individual Jews to maximize their interests at the expense of the Jewish community.”[ix] He makes the point that the propensity of Jews to engage in “tribal economics” involving high levels of within-group economic cooperation and patronage confers on these groups “an extraordinarily powerful competitive advantage against individual strategies.”[x]  The power of this strategy was evident by 1914 when Jews earned five times the income of the average German.[xi]

In 1924, the German economist Gustav Schmoller argued in favor of only admitting small numbers of Jews to the higher ranks of the military or civil service. Otherwise, he feared, “they would swiftly develop into an intolerant dictator of the state and its administration. … How many cases have proved the truth of the prophecy that once you admit the first Jewish full professor, you’ll have five of them or more in ten years’ time.”[xii] In the same year, a delegate to the Bavarian parliament, Ottmar Rutz, noting this tendency and how it had resulted in the Jewish domination of the faculties of Bavarian universities, pointed out that “every Jewish professor and every Jewish civil servant keeps down a descendant of the German people. This sort of exclusion is what’s really at stake. It’s not a matter of insulting or attacking one or another descendant of the Jewish people. This has nothing to do with all of that, and nor do my petitions. This is solely about productively promoting the descendants of the German people and protecting them from exclusion.”[xiii]

Jewish overrepresentation among the learned professions was then, and is now, of such a magnitude that it cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of higher IQ and cultural differences alone — but was and is massively a product of Jewish nepotism. The role of Jewish ethnic networking in the vast overrepresentation of Jews at elite universities in the United States has been revealed by recent studies which have proved that Jews are represented at the Ivy League far beyond what would be predicted by IQ, whereas Whites of European descent are correspondingly underrepresented. For any given level of high IQ, non-Jews far outnumber Jews in America. For example, there are around 7 times as many non-Jews as Jews with an IQ greater than 130 (an IQ typical of successful professionals), and 4.5 times as many with IQ greater than 145. Obviously, there are not seven times as many non-Jews as Jews among elites in the elite sectors of the U.S. — quite the opposite. Would the situation, given the strength of Jewish ethnocentrism, have been any different in Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

Virtually no mention of Jewish cultural subversion as a cause of “anti-Semitism”

As well as completely ignoring the crucially important phenomenon of Jewish ethnic networking, Aly fails to acknowledge the link between disproportionate wealth and disproportionate political, legislative, media and cultural influence, and how this influence was wielded by Jewish elites to reengineer German society in their own interests. Ethnic competition doesn’t only exist in the economic realm but in the cultural and political realms. Resentment fuelled by wealth disparities is only a part (albeit a highly significant part) of a multifaceted picture.

Kevin MacDonald has often noted that it wouldn’t matter if Jews were an economic elite if they were not hostile to the traditional people and culture of the West. The unfortunate reality is that they are hostile, and this hostility has existed for millennia. In Separation and Its Discontents he notes that the heightened level of resource competition between Germans and Jews, especially after 1870, “resulted in very large Jewish overrepresentation in all the markers of economic and professional success as well as the production of culture, the latter viewed as a highly deleterious influence.”[xiv] In his German Genius, Peter Watson observes that after 1880, and especially after the Dreyfus trial in France in 1893, “the Jews were increasingly identified as Europe’s leading ‘degenerates.’”[xv]

A National Socialist source from 1938 points out how “the disintegration and decay of German intellectual life under Jewish supremacy was most apparent and assumed their crudest aspects in the sphere of light entertainment art.” When, in the unstable political aftermath of Germany’s defeat in 1918, at a time when all barriers of law and order had broken down, “a veritable storm of Jewish immoral literature, obscene films and plays then broke over Germany.” The Berlin Revue proprietors who “were Jews without a single exception” offered the public “veritable orgies of sexuality and licentiousness. All realities of life were regarded from the one and only aspect of erotic desire and its satisfaction.” Berlin quickly assumed the mantle of “the most immoral town in the world.” The increasing spread of indecency and immorality forced the government in 1926 to “take constitutional steps for the suppression of filthy or otherwise low-grade literature.”

Revue poster from the Weimar Republic
Revue poster from the Weimar Republic

The themes of Jewish moral, cultural and political subversion permeate the speeches and writings of Hitler and other leading National Socialist figuress. In Mein Kampf Hitler argued that the Jewish influence on German cultural life largely consisted in “dragging the people to the level of his own low mentality.” Likewise he recalls how he once asked himself whether “there was any shady undertaking, any form of foulness, especially in cultural life, in which at least one Jew did not participate?” and later discovered that “On putting the probing knife carefully to that kind of abscess, one immediately discovered, like a maggot in a putrescent body, a little Jew who was often blinded by the sudden light.”[xvi]

In a brief departure from his “envy” theory, Aly himself acknowledges the prevalence of the belief that Jews, through the insidious political and cultural influence they exerted, were destroying mainstream German culture, and that this belief, which spread through all social strata “became a mass phenomenon and paved the way for the racial anti-Semitism at the core of the National Socialist worldview.”[xvii] According to this worldview, “At the close of the emancipation era in Germany, the Jews enjoyed a practical monopoly of all the professions exerting intellectual and political influence. This enabled them to stamp their entirely alien features on the whole public life of the country.”

One of the ways that racial and ethnic groups do battle for position is through controlling the thought and ideas that go into the minds of their competitors. That explains the invariable push by Jews to exercise domination and control over the media and entertainment industries. They realize that media influence is an incredibly important aspect of ethnic competition in the modern world: filling the heads of your ethnic competitors with things that are not true or which are inimical to family life or other adaptive behavior among non-Jews but which help your group to thrive. Those non-Jews who are aware of what is going on naturally resent this waging of ethnic warfare through controlling the public flow of information — and the Germans were no exception.

The German media in the years before 1933 was almost entirely in Jewish hands. The largest circulation newspapers, the Berliner Morgenpost, the Vossische Zeitung, and the Berliner Tageblatt, were owned by the Jewish Ullmann and Mosse companies, and were overwhelmingly staffed by Jewish editors and journalists. The Marxist press, most prominently including newspapers like Vorwärts, Rote Fahne, and Freiheit was likewise under Jewish control. The Jewish essayist Moritz Goldstein observed in 1912 that: “Nobody actually questions the powers the Jews exercise in the press. Criticism, in particular, at least as far as the larger towns and their influential newspapers are concerned, seems to be becoming a Jewish monopoly.”

Even Germans opposed to Hitler, like the Hamburg philosopher and women’s rights activist Margarethe Adam, acknowledged the reality of Jewish media control. In a 1929 discussion on the Jewish Question that she conducted with the Jewish historian and sociologist Eva Reichmann-Jungmann, she noted that “The Jew in his very nature is perceived by the Aryan as a different type of human being.” The hostility of many Europeans towards Jews was, she argued, an almost reflexive response to the “teeth gnashing disdain that Jews felt for Christians.” As evidence for her claim, Adam cited the mighty Jewish press, which was “rife with insults and scorn hurled at the great personages of the German past.” She explained that “this press is what causes people to speak repeatedly of ‘Jewish solidarity’ in the worse sense.”[xviii]

Misrepresenting Heinrich von Treitschke

To buttress his “envy” theory of German “anti-Semitism,” Aly cites the 1879 publication of renowned German historian Heinrich von Treitschke’s article “Our Prospects” in the prestigious journal Preussische Jahrbücher. This article was, Aly claims, addressed by the famous historian “to the sons of the rapidly declining artisan and merchant class,” a group that were “fearful for their future.” In his article, Treitschke raised the idea that “in recent times a dangerous spirit of arrogance has been awakened in Jewish circles,” and he demanded that Jews show more “tolerance and humility,” noting that: “The instincts of the masses have recognized in Jews a pressing danger, a deeply troubling source of damage to our new German life.” The most knowledgeable Germans, he proclaimed, were calling out with one voice: “The Jews are our misfortune.”[xix] According to Aly,
Treitschke’s “Our Prospects” polemic characterized Jewish immigrants to Germany from Eastern Europe as “an invasion of young ambitious trouser salesmen” who aimed to see their “children and grandchildren dominate Germany’s financial markets and newspapers.” The nationalist historian pilloried the “scornfulness of the busy hordes of third-rate Semitic talents” and their “obdurate contempt” for Christian Germans, noting how “tightly this swarm kept to itself.” The holder of four professorships in his lifetime, Treitschke worked himself into a veritable frenzy over “the new Jewish nature,” whose tendencies and attributes included “vulgar contempt,” “addition to scorn,” facile cleverness and agility,” “insistent presumption,” and “offensive self-overestimation.” All of these qualities, Treitschke claimed, worked to the detriment of the Christian majority, with its “humble piety” and “old-fashioned, good-humored love of work.” If Jews continued to insist on their separate identity and refused to be integrated into the German (which to Treitschke, meant Protestant) culture of the nation, the historian threatened that “the only answer would be for them to emigrate and found a Jewish state somewhere abroad.”[xx]
Aly takes Treitschke’s article out of its historical and intellectual context, and claims that the hostility toward Jews in Treitschke’s article, which Aly views as completely baseless, was “symptomatic of Germany as a whole,” and was grounded in pathological envy. However, the actual context of Treitschke’s famous article was explicated in Albert Lindemann’s book Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews. Lindemann, noting how this context is “often neglected or ignored in accounts of the period,” observes that the real catalyst for Treitschke adding his voice to complaints about Jews in Germany was the nature of the work of the leading Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz and its enthusiastic reception among German Jews. Lindemann notes:
Although his History of the Jews is still lauded by twentieth-century Jewish historians as one of the great nineteenth-century histories of the Jews, there is little question that the sense of Jewish superiority expressed in it, especially in the eleventh volume, which had first appeared in 1868, was at times narrow and excessive. Indeed compared with it, Treitschke’s history of the Germans may be described as generous in spirit, especially in its treatment of the relationships of Jews and non-Jews, their relative merits and defects.[xxi]
Lindemann points outs that Graetz harbored a “deep contempt for the ancient Greeks and a special derision for Christians in the Middle Ages.” Presaging Freud and the Frankfurt School, Graetz considered contemporary European civilization to be “morally and physically sick.” Lindemann observes that “Graetz had written much that was stunningly offensive to German sensibilities of the time” and that it was hardly surprising that Treitschke responded with “such fury.” Celebrating deceit and guile as highly effective forms of ethnic warfare, Graetz had written that the Jewish writers Boerne and Heine had “renounced Judaism, but only like combatants who, putting on the uniform of the enemy, can all the more easily strike and annihilate him.” Moreover, in his private correspondence, Graetz “expressed his destructive contempt for German values and Christianity more forthrightly.” In a letter to Moses Hess, written in 1868, for instance, he wrote that “we must above all work to shatter Christianity.”

Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz
Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz

On becoming aware of such views, Treitschke angrily observed that “the man shakes with glee every time he can say something downright nasty against the Germans.”[xxii] It was reading Graetz and noting how his brand of history was so highly esteemed by Jews that prompted Treitschke to echo the reactions of many Germans to having their people, culture and religion derided by members of an alien race living in their midst, noting that:
What deadly hatred of the purist and most powerful exponents of German character, from Luther to Goethe and Fichte! And what hollow, offensive self-glorification! Here it is proved with continuous satirical invective that the nation of Kant was really educated to humanity by Jews only, that the language of Lessing and Goethe became sensitive to beauty, spirit and wit only through [the Jews] Boerne and Heine! … And this stubborn contempt for the German goyim is not at all the attitude of a single fanatic.[xxiii]
Graetz found his counterpart in the Weimar Republic in the figure of the Jewish intellectual and journalist Kurt Tucholsky who, using a variety of pseudonyms, “scoffed at the ideals of the German nation: he flung his biting sarcasm and venomous mockery at every religious and national sentiment.”   By deliberately excluding the historical and intellectual context of Treitschke’s famous article, Aly perpetuates the false narrative that German hostility towards Jews had absolutely nothing whatever to do with Jewish behavior. This deliberate distortion enables Aly to blithely dismiss Treitschke as an “intellectual agitator” and producer of “anti-Jewish polemics.”

The author also gives the German composer Richard Wagner this kind of shabby treatment, dismissing him as “a paradigmatic example of the way that resentment provoked hatred for Jews among German intellectuals and artists.” As I have previously noted, there is a great deal of validity in the opinions Wagner expressed with regard to the Jewish Question. Aly is unwilling, however to subject Wagner’s writing to any detailed and fair-minded analysis, simply arguing that “none of Wagner’s assorted justifications could disguise the personal economic interest that clearly lay behind his animosity.”[xxiv] According to Aly, anti-Jewish statements are never rational, but always the product of a warped mind, while Jewish critiques of Europeans always have a thoroughly rational basis.

Conclusion

Aly concludes his book by claiming that “Today’s generations of Germans owe a lot to their ancestors’ desires to get ahead in the world. Precisely for that reason, there is no way for them to divorce anti-Semitism from their family histories.” Reinforcing the toxic culture of the Holocaust that is today leading Germany to destruction, he argues that today’s Germans have a moral obligation to come to terms with and atone for “the murderous anti-Semitism of their forefathers.”[xxv]

Despite its many shortcomings (in truth because of them) Why the Germans? Why the Jews? has been lauded by establishment critics. Christopher Browning, writing for the New York Review of Books, described Aly’s book as: “A remarkably fresh look at an old problem. …  Aly is one of the most innovative and resourceful scholars working in the field of Holocaust studies. Time and again he has demonstrated an uncanny ability to find hitherto untapped sources, frame insightful questions, and articulate clear if often challenging and controversial arguments.”

The majority of Jewish critics have been similarly admiring. Dagmar Herzog, writing for the New York Times, maintained that “the lavish evidence Aly heaps on — from both self-revealing anti-Semites and acutely prescient Jewish writers — is incredible in its own right and makes for gripping reading.” The Jewish Daily Forward called the book “Consistently absorbing. … A penetrating and provocative study [that] offers shrewd insight into the German mindset over the last two centuries.” Misha Brumlik, writing for the German publication Die Zeit, labelled Aly’s work “Brilliant, passionate, provocative” and according to Michael Blumenthal, once Jimmy Carter’s Treasury secretary and now director of Berlin’s Jewish Museum, claimed that Aly’s “analysis of a profound social malady has made the incomprehensible comprehensible.”[xxvi]

However, for some, Aly’s pathological envy thesis — despite his assiduous efforts to locate the sources of this envy exclusively in the pathologies and malformations of the German mind — is unsatisfactory because it fails to fully capture the truly “evil” nature of the “anti-Semitism” that once pervaded German society. Writing for Commentary magazine the Jewish writer Daniel Johnson dismissed Aly’s underlying message as “a more scholarly version of Hannah Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’ thesis.” According to Johnson, “What made the evil of the Shoah ‘radical’ is that it had no social or economic rationale. Because it had no motive or purpose beyond its own insane internal logic, its cruelty also had no limits, no proportionality, no humanity. It was literally inhuman.” He claims that “envy is too mild a motivation” to account for “truly evil” depths of German Jew-hatred. In his view, “There is something darker, more pathological, more ‘incomprehensible’ going on here.”

While Why the Germans? Why the Jews? flirts with the truth, it is marred by the distortions and omissions I have identified in this review. Competition for access to resources broadly construed to include competition over the construction of culture is undoubtedly a prime cause of intergroup hostility — and it was an important contributing factor in German hostility toward Jews in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To be charitable, making “envy” the sole causal factor for post-Enlightenment German “anti-Semitism,” is overly simplistic. The sources of German hostility to Jews during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were manifold: Jewish economic competition (exacerbated by Jewish ethnic networking and nepotism), disproportionate Jewish involvement in revolutionary political movements, and Jewish moral and cultural subversion and domination. Ethnic competition takes many forms, and the assertion by Jews of their ethnic interests (economically, politically and culturally) inevitably leads to hostility from those whose interests are compromised. The Germans of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were no exception. Given the ubiquity of “anti-Semitism” throughout history, it should be obvious to everyone that Jews themselves are the carriers and transmitters of “anti-Semitism.”

Notes:
[i] Norman Cantor, The Jewish Experience: An Illustrated History of Jewish Culture & Society (New York; Castle Press, 1996), 364.
[ii] Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf (Enigma Books, 2003), 236-37.
[iii] Jerry Muller, Capitalism and the Jews (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 91.
[iv] Götz Aly, Why the Germans? Why the Jews?: Envy, Race Hatred, and the Prehistory of the Holocaust (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014), 34.
[v] Ibid., 55.
[vi] Ibid., 34.
[vii] Ibid., 36.
[viii] Ibid., 38.
[ix] Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy with Diaspora People (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002), 247.
[x] Ibid., 217.
[xi] Götz Aly, Why the Germans?, 31.
[xii] Götz Aly, Why the Germans?, 132.
[xiii] Ibid., 137-38.
[xiv] Kevin MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents: Toward An Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism (1st Books Library, 2004), 170.
[xv] Watson, The German Genius: Europe’s Third Renaissance, the Second Scientific Revolution and the Twentieth Century (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 434.
[xvi] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf ( London, Imperial Collegiate Publishing, 2010), 281; 58.
[xvii] Aly, Why the Germans?, 4.
[xviii] Ibid., 161-62.
[xix] Ibid., 74.
[xx] Ibid., 77.
[xxi] Albert Lindemann, Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 139-40.
[xxii] Ibid., 141.
[xxiii] Ibid., 140.
[xxiv] Ibid., 39.
[xxv] Aly, Why the Germans?, 232.
[xxvi] Ibid., Back cover.

Craft for Breaking the Anti-White Siege

via NationalSalvation.net

Annihilation by Assimilation

Nobody is saying that Africa needs diversity.

Nobody is saying that Asia needs diversity.

They are already 100% diverse.

People are only telling white children in white countries that they need diversity.

White countries will be 100% diverse when there are no white people left.

Diversity is a code-word for the genocide of white people.


Every white country on earth is supposed to become multicultural and multiracial.
Every white country is expected to end its own race and end its own culture. No one asks that of ANY non-white country.
 
The Netherlands is as crowded as Japan, Belgium is as crowded as Taiwan, but nobody says Japan or Taiwan will solve the RACE problem by bringing in millions of third-worlders and assimilating and intermarrying with them.
 
Everybody says the final solution to the RACE problem is for EVERY white country and ONLY white countries to bring in the third world and assimilate with them.
 
Immigration, tolerance, and especially assimilation are being used against the white race.
 
All this immigration and intermarriage is for EVERY white country and ONLY white countries.
 
Anti-white is called anti-racist, but it leads to the disappearance of one race and only one race, the white race. The real aim of anti-racism is to wipe out the white race or make it a minority anywhere it exists.
 
It is genocide.
 
Would a Black Line Go Unnoticed?
What if the same “anti-racist” policy that is at the heart of World Opinion today were applied to black countries?
 
Anti-whites insist on non-white immigration into white countries that have not adequately mixed to be called brown.
 
An example of the policy reversed would be if World Opinion split the island of Santo Domingo into two categories, the Dominican Republic, which is mixed race, and Haiti, which is black.
 
If the same policy currently applied to white countries were applied to Haiti, Haiti would be forced to be “ready for immigration,” as they are saying of Eastern Europe. The anti-white policy reversed would divide every island in the Caribbean into “black” and “mixed enough.”
 
The American Virgin Islands are definitely black enough to fall inside the Black Line and World Opinion would demand they bring in non-black immigrants AND assimilate with them. In contrast, Puerto Rico, if it were independent, would be considered “brown enough” to lie outside the Black Line and immigration would not be forced on the theory that it was mixed with enough light-skinned people to pass.
 
The Black Line would run between the coast of Africa and Madagascar and also be somewhere in the Sahara and about the top of Ethiopia. World Opinion would demand that all of the countries within the Black Line have non-black immigration forced upon them so that they were mixed with enough light-skinned people to be considered the “proper” shade of brown.
 
What are the chances that the Black Line would go unnoticed if every single strip of land inside it, as in the case of the divided island of Santo Domingo, were the focus of a world-wide “anti-racist” campaign?
 
What if the attitude of World Opinion would be instantly hostile toward any country considered “too black”?
 
What sane black man would not object to this on the grounds of the genocide of black people? 


Genocide is Worse than Discrimination‎


Doing away with whites is not idealistic; it is the sort of thing a lot of people got hanged for.

Certainly we cannot discuss future racial policy until a free discussion, and I mean totally free discussion, has been allowed on the present policy of demanding that All white countries and ONLY white countries be open to massive third-world immigration and forced into assimilation, with assimilation meaning intermarriage and an end of what THEY call the white race.

Until we get the basic message of white genocide across, we cannot go on to say that genocide is considered a far, far more serious crime than discrimination. The idea that a plan to completely get rid of a non-black race is worse than putting black people at the back of a bus would meet screams of resentment and bring out the Thought Police.


But we are faced with the utter destruction of what THEY call white people when there is immigration or punishment to be inflicted. THEY have set the precedents when it comes to discrimination.

If mere discrimination is cause for affirmative action, genocide is far more so. Which means that the program of doing away with all white people to the point where Europe and America are to be majority non-white this century requires a lot more than merely changing this policy. It calls for affirmative action at a far higher level to make up for this criminal behavior.

It will call for affirmative action so extreme that it is as alien to this genocidal age as the mention of hiring blacks over whites would have been when slavery was the issue.

And slavery is a lesser crime than genocide.


Africa for the Africans, Asia for the Asians, White Countries for Everyone

There will still be Africans in Africa. There will still be Asians in Asia. But my race is set to be blended out of existence through mass immigration and forced assimilation.

That's genocide. 

This is happening in ALL white countries and ONLY white countries. 

This is genocide through racial replacement. 

Wake up and fight the system! 


Robert Whitaker

There are two kinds of people, those with hearts and minds in alignment, and those who trade deference for pay, done solely for personal advantage.
 
However, do not be quick to praise those whose commitments and loyalties are genuine, for they may nevertheless serve resentments and objects that are unworthy, dangerous in their power to lead others astray.
 
But a small minority are different. Not only are their hearts and minds aligned, their loyalty is to the simple and obvious truth tragically unsaid: the greatest evils of any age are denied and unrecognized.
 
These are our real leaders. This is Robert Whitaker.

Despite Trotskyite Neo-Cons Best Efforts Nationalism and Populism Have Overtaken "Conservatism" in GOP

via American Renaissance

Conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh said Wednesday that Trump’s popularity is evidence that “nationalism and populism have overtaken conservatism” in the Republican Party.

“The Trump triumph–the Trump coalition–is exposing the fact that it isn’t conservative orthodoxy, or conservatism or any of the hard work of the conservative elite,” explained Limbaugh, “that is causing people to be conservative.”
LIMBAUGH: It’s something really simple . . . They’re fed up with the modern day Democratic Party . . . The Republican Party establishment does not understand this. They do not know who their conservative voters are. They’ve over-estimated their conservatism . . . They’re not liberals. They’re not Democrat. Many of them do not want to be thought of as conservatives for a host of reasons. So somebody who comes along and is able to convey that he or she understands why they’re angry and furthermore, is going to do everything to fix it, is going to own them. What’s happening here is that ‘nationalism’–dirty word, ooh people hate it–and ‘populism’–even dirtier word. Nationalism and populism have overtaken conservatism in terms of appeal.
[Editor’s Note: Audio from this segment is available here. Also during the program, Mr. Limbaugh spoke of Sam Francis, noting that he “acquired the reputation of being a white supremacist. Undeservedly so, but there have been efforts undertaken to destroy his credibility and so forth.” Read more here.]

Last Hope for White America?

via EGI Notes

A common theme this electoral cycle is for some in the "movement," including "leaders," to claim that Trump's candidacy is the "last hope for White America."

In my opinion that is an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible thing to say, for two reasons.

First, as I've already discussed here, it is more of the "man on white horse" syndrome, a search for quick-fix saviors, reading into people what they are not, raising unreasonable expectations, and setting activists up for the inevitable disappointment.

Whatever his virtues, Trump is an old man with no political experience, a man who not so long ago was liberal on immigration (the Trump who criticized Romney on "self-deportation" in 2012 would be considered a "cuckservative" by today's standards) and who apparently is still liberal about affirmative action today.  Sure, I say "vote for Trump" in order to destabilize the System, but let's be realistic.  

One can argue that there is balkanization benefit for some White racialists to openly support Trump. The more successful Trump is while at the same time being "linked to White supremacism" then the more this increases racial distrust and chaos in America - all good things.  Therefore, racialists need to toe a fine line with Trump - support him sufficiently so as to make the public associate Trump with a pro-White attitude, but not so much support that it lessens Trump's electability.  From the standpoint of optimal balkanization, an equilibrium needs to be achieved of just the right amount of far-Right support, so as to create the public perception of a politically successful "hater."

But that's perception.  To actually state to activists that Trump is "the last hope of White America" goes too far.  It invests too much into the man, and it is not necessary to link him to racialism.  In other words, instead of using Trump instrumentally, in a dispassionate manner, to advance specific racialist goals, the "movement" is becoming emotionally attached to Trump, and is taking its own rhetoric about him and his candidacy too seriously. The "movement" is thus setting itself up for a fall.

Second, if you say Trump is the "last hope" then what happens if he is unsuccessful (or if he is elected and then disappoints)?  What then? Do you say "it's all over for White America?" Do you admit that your previous statements were wrong or merely melodramatic hyperbole? Or do you pretend like nothing happened and hope the "movement" rank-and-file forgets all about it?  Any of that is a recipe for cynicism and disillusionment.  How many times can activists get "burned" by all these would-be-saviors before people get disgusted and give up?

How about saying Trump is a "great opportunity" rather than a "last hope?" Isn't it obvious that apocalyptic language can be overused?  Or is the affirmative action "movement" "leadership" unable to understand this, being elevated to their position for reasons other than merit?  Or maybe they see Trump as benefiting from the same affirmative action within the "movement" that they do themselves?

To quote a Nutzi who apparently is a supporter of the "movement's" ethnic affirmative action program: lulz.

Donald Trump and the Politics of Resentment

via The Archdruid Report

Of all the predictions I made for the new year in my post two weeks ago, the one that seems to have stirred up the most distress and derision is my suggestion that the most likely person to be standing up there with his hand on a Bible next January, taking the oath of office as the next president of the United States, is Donald Trump. That prediction wasn’t made to annoy people, entertaining as that can be from time to time; nor is it merely a reaction to Trump’s meteoric rise in the polls and the abject failure of any of his forgettable Republican rivals even to slow him down.
The rise of Donald Trump, rather, marks the arrival of a turning point I’ve discussed more than once in these essays already. Like the other turning points whose impending appearance on the stage of the future has been outlined here, it’s not the end of the world; it’s thus a source of amusement to me to recall all those Republicans who insisted they were going to flee the country if Obama won reelection, and are still here, when I hear Democrats saying they’ll do the same thing if Trump wins. Still, there’s a difference of some importance between the two, because in terms of the historical trajectory of the United States, Trump is a far more significant figure than Barack Obama will ever be.
Despite the empty rhetoric about hope and change that surrounded his 2008 campaign, after all, Obama continued the policies of his predecessor George W. Bush so unswervingly that we may as well call those policies—the conventional wisdom or, rather, the conventional folly of early 21st-century American politics—the Dubyobama consensus. Trump’s candidacy, and in some ways that of his Democratic rival Bernard Sanders as well, marks the point at which the blowback from those policies has become a massive political fact. That this blowback isn’t taking the form desired by many people on the leftward end of things is hardly surprising; it was never going to do so, because the things about the Dubyobama consensus that made blowback inevitable are not the things to which the left objects.
To understand what follows, it’s going to be necessary to ask my readers—especially, though not only, those who consider themselves liberals, or see themselves inhabiting some other position left of center in the convoluted landscape of today’s American politics—to set aside two common habits. The first is the reflexive resort to sneering mockery that so often makes up for the absence of meaningful political thought in the US—again, especially but by no means only on the left. The dreary insults that have been flung so repetitively at Donald Trump over the course of his campaign are fine examples of the species: “deranged Cheeto,” “tomato-headed moron,” “delusional cheese creature,” and so on.
The centerpiece of most of these insults, when they’re not simply petulant schoolboy taunts aimed at Trump’s physical appearance, is the claim that he’s stupid. This is hardly surprising, as a lot of people on the leftward end of American culture love to use the kind of demeaning language that attributes idiocy to those who disagree with them. Thus it probably needs to be pointed out here that Trump is anything but stupid. He’s extraordinarily clever, and one measure of his cleverness is the way that he’s been able to lure so many of his opponents into behaving in ways that strengthen his appeal to the voters that matter most to his campaign. In case you’re wondering if you belong to that latter category, dear reader, if you like to send out tweets comparing Trump’s hair to Cheese Whiz, no, you’re not.
So that’s the first thing that has to be set aside to make sense of the Trump phenomenon. The second is going to be rather more challenging for many of my readers: the notion that the only divisions in American society that matter are those that have some basis in biology. Skin color, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability—these are the lines of division in society that Americans like to talk about, whatever their attitudes to the people who fall on one side or another of those lines. (Please note, by the way, the four words above: “some basis in biology.” I’m not saying that these categories are purely biological in nature; every one of them is defined in practice by a galaxy of cultural constructs and presuppositions, and the link to biology is an ostensive category marker rather than a definition. I insert this caveat because I’ve noticed that a great many people go out of their way to misunderstand the point I’m trying to make here.)
Are the lines of division just named important? Of course they are. Discriminatory treatment on the basis of those factors is a pervasive presence in American life today. The facts remain that there are other lines of division in American society that lack that anchor in biology, that some of these are at least as pervasive in American life as those listed above—and that some of the most important of these are taboo topics, subjects that most people in the US today will not talk about.
Here’s a relevant example. It so happens that you can determine a huge amount about the economic and social prospects of people in America today by asking one remarkably simple question: how do they get most of their income? Broadly speaking—there are exceptions, which I’ll get to in a moment—it’s from one of four sources: returns on investment, a monthly salary, an hourly wage, or a government welfare check. People who get most of their income from one of those four things have a great many interests in common, so much so that it’s meaningful to speak of the American people as divided into an investment class, a salary class, a wage class, and a welfare class.
It’s probably necessary to point out explicitly here that these classes aren’t identical to the divisions that Americans like to talk about. That is, there are plenty of people with light-colored skin in the welfare class, and plenty of people with darker skin in the wage class.  Things tend to become a good deal more lily-white in the two wealthier classes, though even there you do find people of color. In the same way, women, gay people, disabled people, and so on are found in all four classes, and how they’re treated depends a great deal on which of these classes they’re in. If you’re a disabled person, for example, your chances of getting meaningful accommodations to help you deal with your disability are by and large considerably higher if you bring home a salary than they are if you work for a wage.
As noted above, there are people who don’t fall into those divisions. I’m one of them; as a writer, I get most of my income from royalties on book sales, which means that a dollar or so from every book of mine that sells via most channels, and rather less than that if it’s sold by Amazon—those big discounts come straight out of your favorite authors’ pockets—gets mailed to me twice a year. There are so few people who make their living this way that the royalty classlet isn’t a significant factor in American society. The same is true of most of the other ways of making a living in the US today. Even the once-mighty profit class, the people who get their income from the profit they make on their own business activities, is small enough these days that it lacks a significant collective presence.
There’s a vast amount that could be said about the four major classes just outlined, but I want to focus on the political dimension, because that’s where they take on overwhelming relevance as the 2016 presidential campaign lurches on its way. Just as the four classes can be identified by way of a very simple question, the political dynamite that’s driving the blowback mentioned earlier can be seen by way of another simple question: over the last half century or so, how have the four classes fared?
The answer, of course, is that three of the four have remained roughly where they were. The investment class has actually had a bit of a rough time, as many of the investment vehicles that used to provide it with stable incomes—certificates of deposit, government bonds, and so on—have seen interest rates drop through the floor.  Still, alternative investments and frantic government manipulations of stock market prices have allowed most people in the investment class to keep up their accustomed lifestyles.
The salary class, similarly, has maintained its familiar privileges and perks through a half century of convulsive change. Outside of a few coastal urban areas currently in the grip of speculative bubbles, people whose income comes mostly from salaries can generally afford to own their homes, buy new cars every few years, leave town for annual vacations, and so on. On the other end of the spectrum, the welfare class has continued to scrape by pretty much as before, dealing with the same bleak realities of grinding poverty, intrusive government bureacracy, and a galaxy of direct and indirect barriers to full participation in the national life, as their equivalents did back in 1966.
And the wage class? Over the last half century, the wage class has been destroyed.
In 1966 an American family with one breadwinner working full time at an hourly wage could count on having a home, a car, three square meals a day, and the other ordinary necessities of life, with some left over for the occasional luxury. In 2016, an American family with one breadwinner working full time at an hourly wage is as likely as not to end up living on the street, and a vast number of people who would happily work full time even under those conditions can find only part-time or temporary work when they can find any jobs at all. The catastrophic impoverishment and immiseration of the American wage class is one of the most massive political facts of our time—and it’s also one of the most unmentionable. Next to nobody is willing to talk about it, or even admit that it happened.
The destruction of the wage class was largely accomplished by way of two major shifts in American economic life. The first was the dismantling of the American industrial economy and its replacement by  Third World sweatshops; the second was mass immigration from Third World countries. Both of these measures are ways of driving down wages—not, please note, salaries, returns on investment, or welfare payments—by slashing the number of wage-paying jobs, on the one hand, while boosting the number of people competing for them on the other. Both, in turn, were actively encouraged by government policies and, despite plenty of empty rhetoric on one or the other side of the Congressional aisle, both of them had, for all practical purposes, bipartisan support from the political establishment. 
It’s probably going to be necessary to talk a bit about that last point. Both parties, despite occasional bursts of crocodile tears for American workers and their families, have backed the offshoring of jobs to the hilt. Immigration is a slightly more complex matter; the Democrats claim to be in favor of it, the Republicans now and then claim to oppose it, but what this means in practice is that legal immigration is difficult but illegal immigration is easy. The result was the creation of an immense work force of noncitizens who have no economic or political rights they have any hope of enforcing, which could then be used—and has been used, over and over again—to drive down wages, degrade working conditions, and advance the interests of employers over those of wage-earning employees.
The next point that needs to be discussed here—and it’s the one at which a very large number of my readers are going to balk—is who benefited from the destruction of the American wage class. It’s long been fashionable in what passes for American conservatism to insist that everyone benefits from the changes just outlined, or to claim that if anybody doesn’t, it’s their own fault. It’s been equally popular in what passes for American liberalism to insist that the only people who benefit from those changes are the villainous uber-capitalists who belong to the 1%. Both these are evasions, because the destruction of the wage class has disproportionately benefited one of the four classes I sketched out above: the salary class.
Here’s how that works. Since the 1970s, the salary class lifestyle sketched out above—suburban homeownership, a new car every couple of years, vacations in Mazatlan, and so on—has been an anachronism: in James Howard Kunstler’s useful phrase, an arrangement without a future. It was wholly a product of the global economic dominance the United States wielded in the wake of the Second World War, when every other major industrial nation on the planet had its factories pounded to rubble by the bomber fleets of the warring powers, and the oil wells of Pennsylvania, Texas, and California pumped more oil than the rest of the planet put together.  That dominance went away in a hurry, though, when US conventional petroleum production peaked in 1970, and the factories of Europe and Asia began to outcompete America’s industrial heartland.
The only way for the salary class to maintain its lifestyle in the teeth of those transformations was to force down the cost of goods and services relative to the average buying power of the salary class.  Because the salary class exercised (and still exercises) a degree of economic and political influence disproportionate to its size, this became the order of the day in the 1970s, and it remains the locked-in political consensus in American public life to this day. The destruction of the wage class was only one consequence of that project—the spectacular decline in quality of the whole range of manufactured goods for sale in America, and the wholesale gutting of the national infrastructure, are other results—but it’s the consequence that matters in terms of today’s politics.
It’s worth noting, along these same lines, that every remedy that’s been offered to the wage class by the salary class has benefited the salary class at the expense of the wage class. Consider the loud claims of the last couple of decades that people left unemployed by the disappearance of wage-paying jobs could get back on board the bandwagon of prosperity by going to college and getting job training. That didn’t work out well for the people who signed up for the student loans and took the classes—getting job training, after all, isn’t particularly helpful if the jobs for which you’re being trained don’t exist, and so a great many former wage earners finished their college careers with no better job prospects than they had before, and hundreds of thousands of dollars of student loan debt burdening them into the bargain. For the banks and colleges that pushed the loans and taught the classes, though, these programs were a cash cow of impressive scale, and the people who work for banks and colleges are mostly salary class.
Attempts by people in the wage class to mount any kind of effective challenge to the changes that have gutted their economic prospects and consigned them to a third-rate future have done very little so far. To some extent, that’s a function of the GOP’s sustained effort to lure wage class voters into backing Republican candidates on religious and moral grounds. It’s the mirror image of the ruse that’s been used by the Democratic party on a galaxy of interests on the leftward end of things—granted, the Democrats aren’t doing a thing about the issues that matter most to you, but neither are the Republicans, so you vote for the party that offends you least. Right? Sure, if you want to guarantee that the interests that matter most to you never get addressed at all.
There’s a further barrier, though, and that’s the response of the salary class across the board—left, right, middle, you name it—to any attempt by the wage class to bring up the issues that matter to it. On the rare occasions when this happens in the public sphere, the spokespeople of the wage class get shouted down with a double helping of the sneering mockery I discussed toward the beginning of this post. The same thing happens on a different scale on those occasions when the same thing happens in private. If you doubt this—and you probably do, if you belong to the salary class—try this experiment: get a bunch of your salary class friends together in some casual context and get them talking about ordinary American working guys. What you’ll hear will range from crude caricatures and one-dimensional stereotypes right on up to bona fide hate speech. People in the wage class are aware of this; they’ve heard it all; they’ve been called stupid, ignorant, etc., ad nauseam for failing to agree with whatever bit of self-serving dogma some representative of the salary class tried to push on them.
And that, dear reader, is where Donald Trump comes in.
The man is brilliant. I mean that without the smallest trace of mockery. He’s figured out that the most effective way to get the wage class to rally to his banner is to get himself attacked, with the usual sort of shrill mockery, by the salary class. The man’s worth several billion dollars—do you really think he can’t afford to get the kind of hairstyle that the salary class finds acceptable? Of course he can; he’s deliberately chosen otherwise, because he knows that every time some privileged buffoon in the media or on the internet trots out another round of insults directed at his failure to conform to salary class ideas of fashion, another hundred thousand wage class voters recall the endless sneering putdowns they’ve experienced from the salary class and think, “Trump’s one of us.”
The identical logic governs his deliberate flouting of the current rules of acceptable political discourse. Have you noticed that every time Trump says something that sends the pundits into a swivet, and the media starts trying to convince itself and its listeners that this time he’s gone too far and his campaign will surely collapse in humiliation, his poll numbers go up?  What he’s saying is exactly the sort of thing that you’ll hear people say in working class taverns and bowling alleys when subjects such as illegal immigration and Muslim jihadi terrorism come up for discussion. The shrieks of the media simply confirm, in the minds of the wage class voters to whom his appeal is aimed, that he’s one of them, an ordinary Joe with sensible ideas who’s being dissed by the suits.
Notice also how many of Trump’s unacceptable-to-the-pundits comments have focused with laser precision on the issue of immigration. That’s a well-chosen opening wedge, as cutting off illegal immigration is something that the GOP has claimed to support for a while now. As Trump broadens his lead, in turn, he’s started to talk about the other side of the equation—the offshoring of jobs—as his recent jab at Apple’s overseas sweatshops shows. The mainstream media’s response to that jab does a fine job of proving the case argued above: “If smartphones were made in the US, we’d have to pay more for them!” And of course that’s true: the salary class will have to pay more for its toys if the wage class is going to have decent jobs that pay enough to support a family. That this is unthinkable for so many people in the salary class—that they’re perfectly happy allowing their electronics to be made for starvation wages in an assortment of overseas hellholes, so long as this keeps the price down—may help explain the boiling cauldron of resentment into which Trump is so efficiently tapping.
It’s by no means certain that Trump will ride that resentment straight to the White House, though at this moment it does seem like the most likely outcome. Still, I trust none of my readers are naive enough to think that a Trump defeat will mean the end of the phenomenon that’s lifted him to front runner status in the teeth of everything the political establishment can throw at him. I see the Trump candidacy as a major watershed in American political life, the point at which the wage class—the largest class of American voters, please note—has begun to wake up to its potential power and begin pushing back against the ascendancy of the salary class.
Whether he wins or loses, that pushback is going to be a defining force in American politics for decades to come. Nor is a Trump candidacy anything approaching the worst form that could take. If Trump gets defeated, especially if it’s done by obviously dishonest means, the next leader to take up the cause of the wage class could very well be fond of armbands or, for that matter, of roadside bombs. Once the politics of resentment come into the open, anything can happen—and this is particularly true, it probably needs to be said, when the resentment in question is richly justified by the behavior of many of those against whom it’s directed.